


Helms, the Shah and the CIA

THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only because of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intelligence Agency as well as American foreign policy.

Helms first went to work at the CIA in 1947 and he came up to his present post as director through what is generally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to show that he personally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or oriented regime of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, an action that returned the Shah to his throne. One can only guess at the wry smile that must have come to the Shah's face when he first heard that President Nixon was proposing to send the CIA's top man to be the American envoy.

The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at



1953: Teheran rioting that overthrew the government left the United States Point Four office with gaping holes for windows and doors.

the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian story in their book, "The Invisible Government," and the CIA boss at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public after he left the government that the United States had had a hand in what occurred.

IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who confused Westerners with his habits of weeping in public and running government business from his bed, nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and seized the Abadan refinery. The West boycotted Iranian oil

and the country was thrown into crisis. Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, to bolster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zareh to replace him. The man who stage-managed the job on the spot was Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goings-on in Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washingtonian in private business.

Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set up underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnapping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roosevelt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named Zahedi as Premier but Mossadegh arrested the officer who brought the bad news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shah fled first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roosevelt ordered the Shah's backers into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossadegh went to jail. In time a new international oil consortium took over Anglo-Iranian which operates to this day, though the Shah has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners.

In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published after he left CIA, Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran and Guatemala it "became clear" that a Communist state was in the making, "support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements." In a 1965 NBC television documentary on "The Science of Spying" Dulles said: "The government of Mossadegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now, that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, wrote in his book, "The Game of Nations," that the Iranian derring-do was called "Operation Ajax." He credited Roosevelt with "almost single-handedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces on to the streets of Teheran" and supervising "their riots so as to oust" Mossadegh.

TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms will go after he leaves the CIA is a stable, well armed and well oil-financed regime under the Shah's command which has mended its fences with Moscow without hurting its close relationship with Washington. The Shah has taken full advantage of the changes in East-West relations from the Cold War

While Iran and Guatemala were the high points of covert CIA Cold War ac-

tivity, there were plenty of other successful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has withdrawn from such large scale affairs as Iran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer "secret war in Laos." The climate of today would not permit the United States to repeat the Iranian operation, or so one assumes with the reservation that President Nixon (who was Vice President at the time of Iran) loves surprises.

The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must be taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troubled waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bissell, who ran the U-2 program and the Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activities. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war . . . is so infinitely easier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encountered this as a serious problem."

PERHAPS the philosophy of the Cold War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then forthcoming book had appeared in Harper's and I had suggested to him some further revelations he might include in the book. He wrote about additions he was making: "This includes more on Iran and Guatemala and the problems of policy in action when there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist take-over is threatened. We can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid."

There is a story, too, that Winston Churchill was so pleased by the operation in Iran that he proffered the George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But the CIA wouldn't let him accept the decoration. So Churchill commented to Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have served under you" in such an operation. That remark, Roosevelt is said to have replied, was better than the decoration.

Helms doubtless would be the last to say so out loud but I can imagine his reflecting that, if it hadn't been for what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the others did in 1953, he would not have the chance to present his credentials to a Shah still on the peacock throne in 1973.

STATINTL

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Post in Iran Offered To IA Chief Helms

By THOMAS B. ROSS

WASHINGTON, — (CST) — Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is reported to be in line to become ambassador to Iran, the scene of the CIA's first major coup.

The Washington star-news, recipient of several White House leaks on appointments, said this week that President Nixon has offered the ambassadorship to Helms, a career intelligence operative of 25 years' service.

The Chicago Sun-Times disclosed Dec. 2 that Mr. Nixon planned to supplant Helms at the CIA with James R. Schlesinger, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Helm's transfer to Iran is certain to be warmly received by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who owes his crown to the CIA. In 1953 the CIA's representative in the Middle East, Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, organized and directed the coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in the Shah's behalf.

Helms was then a leading official in the CIA's plans division, the so-called "Department of dirty tricks." The turning point in the coup against Mossadegh came when Roosevelt's agents went into the athletic clubs of Tehran and rounded up an assortment of weight lifters, muscle-men and gymnasts who marched through the bazaars, shouting pro-shah slogans and arousing the masses.

The Shah, who fled the country at the height of street disorders during the coup, returned afterward to reverse Mossadegh's nationalization of Iranian oil. At the same time, he broke up the former British monopoly and apportioned U.S. firms a 40 per cent share of a new international consortium.

One of the firms was Gulf Oil, which Roosevelt later became "government relations director" and, later be-joined as "government relations" vice president in Washington.

Oil now figures even more prominently in U.S. Policy toward Iran and the Middle East. A growing energy shortage in the United States may force the administration to rely increasingly on the Persian Gulf, the largest oil reservoir in the world.

Helms' appointment is thus certain to arouse suspicions in the Arab world that the United States and the CIA are maneuvering more aggressively to preserve a solid oil base in the Middle East.

STATINTL

WORCESTER, MASS.

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M - 62,339

S - 108,367

One Good Choice, One—?

In nominating Atomic Energy Commission Chairman James R. Schlesinger as the new head of the Central Intelligence Agency, President Nixon has made an excellent choice.

The backbone of the CIA operation these days is sophisticated technology — spy satellites, electronic monitoring, economic analysis, scientific assessment, etc. The modern spy makes more use of a computer than a cloak and dagger.

As an economist and political scientist schooled in strategic studies, systems analysis and defense spending, Schlesinger is at home in such a milieu. He has done a creditable job in his difficult post with the AEC, which he has held since August of 1971. Before that, he was a key official in the President's Office of Management and Budget, concentrating on expenditures for national security and foreign affairs.

However, in nominating outgoing CIA Director Richard Helms as ambassador to Iran, President Nixon has made a questionable choice.

Helms would probably make an excellent ambassador. But is it prudent to assign a man with Helms'

detailed knowledge of many of our most closely held secrets to a relatively hazardous foreign post?

It will be a great temptation for various terrorist groups, who would delight in such leverage over the United States, or for rival spy networks to lay hands on Helms. He would not be the first American diplomat to have been kidnaped.

Officially, Helms is retiring because he will be 60 years old in March and he has felt all along that CIA officials ought not to serve beyond that age.

Unofficially, there have been rumors that Helms, a charter employee of the CIA and the first career spy to head that agency, is being pushed out to make room for a director more in harmony with an era of technological gadgetry.

The White House has been anxious to stifle such rumors, and that may be what is behind the nomination of Helms as ambassador to Iran.

But whatever the President's motives in naming Helms, the appointment should be carefully studied by the Senate. Iran cannot be anxious to assume the responsibility of providing security for such a tempting target as a former CIA director.

DAILY WORLD
22 DEC 1972**CIA chief returns to scene of crime**

KEY BISCAYNE, Fla.—Richard M. Helms will leave his post as head of the Central Intelligence Agency to become ambassador to Iran, Administration sources said Thursday.

Helms is certain to be warmly received by Iran's Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, who owes his crown to the CIA. In 1953, under Helms' direction, the CIA organized and directed a coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh to restore full and dictatorial powers to the Shah.

The reason for the coup was that Mossadegh, a reformer, had sought to nationalize Iranian oil, which at the time was owned entirely by British firms. Following the coup, the oil was denationalized with 40 percent of it going to U.S. companies.

A.E.C. Chief to Replace Helms as C.I.A. Director

**Schlesinger, 43, Chosen
—Intelligence Official
to Be Envoy to Iran**

By JACK ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Dec. 21 —President Nixon said today that he would nominate James R. Schlesinger, who is chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to be Director of Central Intelligence.

He said also that he would nominate the current director, Richard Helms, to be Ambassador to Iran.


Mr. Helms's departure from the C.I.A. was described as a retirement, consistent with his feeling that he, like other C.I.A. officials, should retire at age 60. He will be 60 in March. There had been rumors that Mr. Helms was being forced out of his job.

The White House took pains to affirm the President's appreciation for Mr. Helms's 30 years of public service and for the fact that it will continue. At the same time, the departure from the C.I.A. is touched with symbolic overtones.

In the opinion of knowledgeable officials, it means the end of an era of professional intelligence operatives and the beginning of an era of systems management. Mr. Helms, who

once interviewed Hitler, as a reporter, epitomizes a generation that developed its expertise during World War II and subsequently helped to create the C.I.A. When appointed in June, 1966, he was the first careerist to become D.C.I.—Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Schlesinger, by contrast, is a 43-year-old economist and political scientist schooled in strategic studies, systems analysis, and defense spending. The author of a detailed report on the intelligence community for



The New York Times
James R. Schlesinger

Mr. Nixon last year, he is expected to take over at the C.I.A. as soon as he is confirmed by the Senate.

Both the Helms and Schlesinger appointments had been forecast.

No successor was named to the A.E.C. chairmanship, which Mr. Schlesinger has held since August, 1971. Before that he had been with the Office of Management and Budget, concentrating on national security and international affairs.

Cost Issue Noted

That experience, coupled with the Administration's apparent interest in the cost and redundancy of intelligence programs, led a close student of C.I.A. to suggest today that what Mr. Nixon now wanted was "more cloak for the buck."

Details about "the agency," as the C.I.A. is known in the Government, are classified. But it is thought to have a budget of more than \$750-million a year and more than 10,000 employees. Most are involved in intelligence—technical assessment, analysis and estimates.

A "plans division" conducts clandestine operations, such as the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. Mr. Helms once directed this division, but not at the time of the Cuban invasion.

His new assignment is to a country whose leader was strongly assisted, according to wide belief, by a clandestine C.I.A. operation in 1953. The agency was reputed to have had a role in the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh, then premier, permitting the Shah of Iran to reassert his control.

If confirmed by the Senate, Mr. Helms will succeed Joseph S. Farland, who has been Ambassador to Iran since May. The White House said today

that he would return to Washington and be reassigned to another post.

According to a private source, the outgoing Deputy Secretary of State, John N. Irwin, is Mr. Nixon's choice to become Ambassador to France. The position has been vacant since the departure in early November of Arthur K. Watson, who is Mr. Irwin's brother-in-law.

In the first news briefing of the President's week-long Christmas trip here, Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, also dealt with the following appointments topics:

Mr. Nixon has accepted "with very special regret" the resignation of David M. Abshire as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. Mr. Abshire will become chairman of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies on Jan. 9.

Speculation about the directorship of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be discounted for the time being Mr. Ziegler said. One newspaper has reported that Acting Director L. Patrick Gray will be formally nominated, another has said he would not be, and a third has been in between, Mr. Ziegler said. The fact is, he continued, that no decision has been made.

Another vacancy arose in Washington today with the resignation of John P. Olsson after 20 months as deputy under secretary of transportation to return to private business.

Mr. Helms's new position comes after 30 years in intelligence work. After graduation from Williams College, he became a United Press correspondent in Germany from 1935 to 1937. Until 1942, when he was commissioned as a Navy officer, he was in newspaper advertising.

STATINTL

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DAILY WORLD
21 DEC 1972

Helms to leave CIA

WASHINGTON — Richard C. Helms, director of the CIA with 25 years experience in international spying, is resigning his post and is in line for appointment as U.S. Ambassador to Iran. One of the commonly cited exploits of the ICA was the ouster of Premier Moissadeh in the 1950s by means of CIA intrigues.

Nixon said he has decided to keep William D. Ruckelshaus as administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Although White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler said that Nixon considers EPA "one of the most important new agencies in government," Nixon ordered that only 40 percent of the Congressional appropriation, passed over his veto, should be spent, 60 percent being withheld.

STATINTL

State Aides in Dark In Choice of Helms

By OSWALD JOHNSTON

Star-News Staff Writer

The White House apparently bypassed normal channels when it informed the Iranian government that Richard M. Helms, outgoing director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would be the next U.S. ambassador in Tehran.

Iranian specialists at the State Department have indicated their office was totally uninformed as recently as yesterday about Helms' nomination. Yet it is understood the Iranian government was informed of the choice through less bureaucratic channels as long as three weeks ago.

Bypassing the bureaucracy in obtaining compliance from a foreign ministry to an ambassadorial appointment from outside the career foreign service is not that rare an occurrence. But Foreign Service veterans are noticing some unusual aspects to the Helms' nomination.

Highly Potent

First is the generally recognized fact that the CIA has acquired a largely mythical but highly potent reputation in much of the underdeveloped Third World as an agent of "U.S. imperialism" and an instigator of political intrigue.

Second is the historical fact that the origins of this reputation lie in the CIA's spectacularly successful 1953 coup d'etat in Iran which, under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt, unseated the anti-Western premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, and reinstalled the present shah, Reza Pahlavi, as ruler.

Third is the circumstance that Helms, from 1952 to 1962, was deputy director of plans at the CIA—the division responsible for planning and carrying out clandestine operations like the Iranian coup. Helms headed the division from 1962 to 1966, when he became CIA director.

Foreign Service sources indicated a belief that these facts and circumstance could explain the otherwise baffling delay in the public announcement by the White House of its choice of Helms to Tehran.

Public Image

Given the widespread impact of the shah's CIA-backed coup on Iran's immediate neighbors in the Middle East,

the Soviet Union and the Indian peninsula, Helms' nomination can scarcely have been received with equanimity even at nearly 20 years' distance.

Despite a carefully nurtured public image of peace, progress and prosperity, Iran in recent years has had to deal with an ugly and persistent problem of internal security.

Dissident groups drawn in part from the Kurdish, Arab and tribal minorities in the country and encouraged by a hostile radical government in neighboring Iraq have kept Savak, the Iranian secret police, busy.

Within the past two years members of the shah's family have been the target of at least one kidnap attempt, and the U.S. embassy has been the target of sabotage and assassination plots.

Security Problem

Memories of the coup are far from dormant in Iran, especially among opponents of the shah's autocratic regime. Against this background, knowledgeable observers agreed, the installation of an American ambassador with Helms' background would present the Iranian government with a delicate security problem.

Sources in the Foreign Service also recalled, somewhat pointedly, the reception accorded the last CIA agent to be given a diplomatic post.

In November 1963, the former director of rural pacification in South Vietnam, Robert W. Komer, arrived in Ankara as ambassador to Turkey and was greeted by a howling mob of students.

It is suggested the three-week delay in announcing Helms' appointment may be explained by the possibility the Iranian government took its time deciding whether it was prudent to receive an American ambassador who at least nominally associated with the coup that returned the shah to his throne.

STATINTL

9 AUG 1972

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Iran's burden of reaction

By Fred Lowe

The government of Iran is becoming increasingly known for its reactionary and repressive character—and for its increasingly important role in the Middle East.

There are now over 24,000 political prisoners in the ruling Shah's prisons and there have been 28 executions carried out in the last three months in closed military trials.

President Nixon, by his long detour to visit the Shah after his trip to the Soviet Union last month, has shown the importance he attaches to the country.

The early 1950s saw the emergence of an extremely popular leader in Iran, Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh, an eloquent nationalist who challenged the Shah's power and called for the nationalization of Iranian oil. In 1951 Mosaddegh nationalized the oil (after Iran in 1958 earned more revenues from its state tobacco monopoly than from petroleum). But in 1953 a coup deposed him, clearly financed, organized and carried out by CIA agents—including such notables as CIA-head Allen Dulles, U.S. Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson and New Jersey police chief Norman Schwarzkopf.

The U.S. proceeded to help the Shah build up his secret police, SAVAK (currently 60,000 members) and poured \$900 million in defense and economic aid between 1953 and 1960. For the five-year period 1965-1970 military credits amounted to \$1.6 billion; for 1971-1972 they continue at the rate of \$1 billion per year.

Iran is the largest oil-producing country of the Persian Gulf states with U.S. oil companies receiving a 40 percent share, and making over two-thirds of the foreign investment there.

Present conditions worse

In the early 1960s, the Shah launched his so-called "white revolution" which was supposed to be a series of reforms which would improve the conditions of the people. But conditions got worse rather than better. Through 1970, 70 percent of the youth over 10 years are still illiterate; there is only one doctor for every 3223 people with less than 12 hospital beds for every 10,000 patients; the average person consumes only about 2.7 pounds of meat per month on a \$75-a-year income. Over 40 percent of the families (Iran has a population of 30 million with 3.5 million crowded into its capital, Teheran) live in one room. Most of these dwellings are made of mud or wood and because of the government's unwillingness to improve their fragility, over 49,500 Iranians have died needlessly from earthquakes in recent years.

The Confederation of Iranian Students, including its chapters in the U.S., raised more than \$40,000 which was sent to Iran (following the 1958 earthquake that killed 20,000 people in Khorasan) along with medicine and a medical team. The money was used to build a school and a hospital.

\$800 million celebration

In October of last year, one of the most psychotic spectacles ever to occur in this century took place in Iran, with the "celebration" of Iran's 2500th year in existence. Amidst all this poverty the Shah had

the audacity to spend over \$800 million for this affair when the yearly expenditures for health, education and welfare amount to a scant total of \$8 million or one-hundredth of the amount spend on the celebration. This event caused such an international outrage that most heads of state who had been invited, backed out of showing up and only 200 people came.

In fact, to ensure that things ran smoothly, 4000 people were imprisoned before the "celebration" and still have not been released.

Military vs guerrillas

In 1972, Iran has devoted more than 33 percent of its budget (\$895 million) to military expenditures. Guerrilla activity has been stepped up in the last two years by liberation movements in Iran and the government has arrested and tortured thousands of people.

Iran has also been chosen by the U.S. to be the "Brazil of the Gulf area"—to act as police in trying to crush liberation movements in the region. The guerrilla struggle in Dhofar, in southern Oman and the successful liberation of Southern Yemen (to form the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) in 1967 have already caused considerable worry to U.S. and British imperialists.

The 20th annual convention of the Iranian Students Association in the U.S. (ISAUS) was held in Berkeley June 17-22 to discuss future activities to bring greater international attention to the repressive character of the Iranian government. The group has been outlawed in Iran and the penalty there for membership is extremely severe. Despite this, the group has been enormously effective in reaching the public.

Plan future actions

The conference ended with some very definite plans for future strategies and actions. The decision was made to form local committees made up of lawyers, journalists and professors to form pressure groups that will publicize conditions in Iran and will have as its goal the granting to these various groups the right to observe trials and also prison conditions in Iran.

In June 1970, 41 Bay Area ISA members were arrested by the San Francisco police while protesting at the Iranian Consulate and their passports have not been renewed. They are facing deportation and years in the Shah's prisons. The Confederation of Iranian Students will launch a worldwide campaign demanding the Iranian Consulate extend their passports. Activities on Northern California campuses will be stepped up and a legal committee will be formed to defend them. ISA plans to start a research project that will more clearly expose the Nixon Doctrine in Iran. It also plans to hold a worldwide "Vietnam Week" after the summer to support the PRG 7-point peace plan and to raise funds for the NLF. Finally, ISA issued statements of solidarity with the workers of the world, especially third world workers and the U.S. farmworkers and dockworkers.

For further information contact the Iranian Students Association
P.O. Box 808, Berkeley, Calif., 94701.

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Victor Zorza

STATINTL

Sadat Fears Soviet Plot

THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL from Egypt could well be the very opposite of what it seems. In Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Kremlin first seemed to pull its troops out, but it then turned them around to invade the country. Russia followed exactly the same pattern in Hungary in 1956, and some disturbing similarities are already becoming apparent in its dealings with Egypt.

The pattern began then, as now, with formal requests that Soviet troops should leave. The Kremlin tried to convince the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak leaders that they would be doing harm to themselves if they persisted in their demand.

Similarly, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt first asked the Russians to withdraw, some months before the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in May. The Russians told him that "this would deprive you of a strategic advantage" when the Middle East came up for discussion at the summit.

When Sadat persisted after the summit, the Kremlin tried to persuade him, according to accounts since published in Cairo, that the retention of Soviet forces would be a "strategic" advantage not only to the Soviet Union but also to Egypt.

WHEN SIMILAR PLEAS failed to persuade the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments, the Russians had no alternative but to leave. At the same time, however, they began plotting to overthrow those governments, in order to replace them with creatures of their own choosing who would then ask Soviet troops to stay. There is some evidence to suggest that this is what Sadat is afraid of—and with good reason.

After Sadat's public announcement of the Soviet pullout, the Soviet party

paper Pravda and broadcasts heard in Arab states began to assert that "one cannot disregard the increasing activities of rightist reactionary forces" in Egypt. These forces—obviously represented by Sadat—were trying "to undermine Soviet-Egyptian friendship."

But they were also opposed, Pravda said, to the "progressive reforms" taking place in Egypt—that is, to the more far-reaching changes urged by the left.

Some middle class groups "are opposing the workers and peasants and are ready to make a deal with imperialism for their own selfish interests," said a Moscow broadcast, quoting a left-wing Cairo weekly whose views seemed closer to the Kremlin than to Sadat. There had lately been a growing demand in Egypt, Moscow Radio added ominously, "that the regime should increase its reliance on the working masses."

Sadat evidently took this as a threat from the Kremlin that it could incite a left-wing revolt against him if he should proceed to give full effect to his announcement that the Russians must leave. He retorted, in a public warning both to Moscow and to his own leftwingers, that "I will never tolerate any fragmentation of national unity under any slogan."

HE CHOSE HIS WORDS in a way which made it clear that he was referring to the possibility of a Moscow inspired plot. "No one," he said, "should imagine himself a power center—No, never." The term 'power center' is normally used in the Egyptian press to describe the group of plotters led by Ali Sabri, the former close associate of Presidents Nasser and Sadat, who is now in prison for trying to overthrow the regime in order to form a more pro-Soviet government.

It matters little that the left has no real power or

popular support in Egypt now. The Russians can arrange to overthrow an Egyptian government, while they themselves remain in the shadows, as efficiently as the CIA overthrew the Mossadegh government in Persia in the 1950s to protect the flow of oil to the West.

A new government in Cairo could promptly ask the Russian troops to stay, or to return—as did the "new" government in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Egyptian-in-the-street would hardly rise up in arms if he was told that the Russians had come back to protect him against an impending Israeli attack.

The Kremlin is no doubt debating now whether to repeat the pattern that proved so successful in the past, when the United States made it amply clear that it would not interfere with Soviet actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Perhaps, the White House should speak now, before it is too late.

The Pentagon Papers— A Discussion

STATINTL

The publication of "confidential" materials has inevitably given rise to a debate concerning a number of different but related problems: To what extent do the revelations contained in the documents throw light on events or policy decisions with which they deal? To what extent, if at all, does the publication of the information contained in the documents jeopardize the processes of executive decisionmaking? How can the conflict between the public's right to know and the executive's need for confidentiality be reconciled? The editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* have in the past published a number of articles dealing with the issue of access to governmental information and the terms on which that access is made available, notably, Adolf A. Berle's and Malcolm Moos's reviews of Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power* (PSQ, LXXIX, June 1964) and Theodore Draper's review of Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (PSQ, LXXXVI, March 1971). The recent publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has given the controversy new urgency. U.S. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, candidate for the Democratic party nomination for president, and Professor John P. Roche, from 1966-68 special consultant to President Lyndon Johnson, were asked by the editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* to review the *Pentagon Papers* and to debate in print the political and legal issues to which their publication has given rise.

I

Publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has raised a storm concerning the right of the press to publish classified government documents. But the contents of the papers are so sweeping in their disclosures of official suppression of the realities in Vietnam, so revealing of the disastrous, secretly conceived policies and practices which led us into this tragic war, that it is impossible—in fact it misses their true significance—to discuss them in such abstract terms.

The integrity of our democracy is profoundly involved, not only in the constitutional sense with respect to the war-making power, but in the basic sense of the reality of government by popular rule. It is axiomatic with us that a free people can remain free only if it is enlightened and informed. It is axiomatic with us, as well, that a free press is essential to the creation and maintenance of an enlightened and informed people. A press which obtains access to a record revealing so massive a gap between what our executive leadership knew and what it led the nation

31 MAY 1972

STATINTL

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Nixon and the Shah shake oily hands

By TOM FOLEY

Teheran, Iran, was the meeting-site yesterday for President Nixon and a man whom the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had restored to power in 1953—Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran.

Nixon's projected 21-hour stay in Teheran was not long enough to do anything except give a psychological boost to the Shah and his regime, who are heavily dependent on U.S. imperialist support. But the Nixon visit also may be related to the impending showdown tomorrow between the major international oil monopolies and Iran's neighbor, Iraq.

Daily World Staff writer Tom Foley, has taught Middle East history at various California universities, and studied for two years at the University of Teheran in Iran.

Iran and Iraq are often confused in the public mind: Iran is a non-Arab but Muslim state of 28 million, nearly as large in area as Western Europe; formerly it was called Persia. Iraq is a bi-national Arab-Kurdish republic, the Mesopotamia and Babylon of ancient times.

Politically, the two countries could not be more different: Iran is a police-state, armed to the teeth by U.S. imperialism and still officially described as an "empire" in Iranian state documents. Iraq has a progressive government, which now includes Communists at the cabinet level, and on April 10 signed a new, 15-year treaty with the Soviet Union which gives Iraq powerful backing in its national struggle with the oil monopolies.

In fact, Iraq today is doing what Iran tried to do when Premier Mohammed Mosaddeq nationalized the Iranian oil fields in 1951. Mosaddeq, a progressive Iranian nationalist, thereby brought his country into a head-on confrontation with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now British Petroleum-BP), in which the British government was the major stockholder.

In the struggle with Britain, Mosaddeq was forced to institute radical reforms and to rely more and more on the Iranian left, which panicked the Shah into flight from Teheran and brought in the CIA. As anybody in Teheran will tell an inquirer who doesn't look like a police agent, the CIA spent \$6 million to overthrow Mosaddeq and restore the Shah. But it did not restore the British monopoly of Iranian oil.

Instead, a "consortium" was set up which gave British oil interests only 40 percent of its former Iranian oil pie. The rest went to Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, and seven minor U.S. companies. The consortium agreement is due to run out in 1979. The National Iranian Oil Company set up by Mosaddeq retains an internal monopoly on oil sales within Iran, but all exports—now more than one billion barrels a year—are the consortium's property.

Both Iran and Iraq are Persian Gulf states, and the Gulf holds 70 percent of the world's known oil reserves. From the Gulf area comes 70 percent of Western Europe's oil and more than 90 percent of Japan and southern Africa's supply.

Iraq, the Middle East's fourth largest oil exporter, recently gave an ultimatum to the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), due to expire tomorrow, to increase oil production and come to terms with the Iraq government, or else Iraq would be obliged to act in its national interests.

IPC in the past few months has cut its Iraqi oil output by 50 percent, although Iraq depends on oil for 65 percent of its revenue.

The IPC was evidently piqued because, with Soviet aid, the Iraqi National Oil Company got the

North Rumeyla oil field, third largest in the world, into production and expects to finance a good part of its radical program through sales of North Rumeyla oil. IPC is made up of—you guessed it—British Petroleum (the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.), Royal Dutch/Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey, the French Petroleum Co., and the Gulbenkian Foundation.

Iraq thus is now battling Iran's old enemy, and the Iranian people have not forgotten that struggle. Although the Shah and his regime have deliberately tried to stir up national and religious strife between Iranians and Iraqis and provoked armed clashes on their borders, it would be certain to anyone who knows the Iranian people that they support Iraq in its struggle with the oil monopolies. And that no doubt makes the Shah welcome Nixon, to show people who really runs Iran.

«ЛИНГВИСТ»-

По сообщению корреспондента ЮПИ из Вашингтона, «после получасового дружественного опроса» сенатская комиссия по делам вооруженных сил утвердила назначение генерал-майора Вернона Уолтерса на пост заместителя директора Центрального разведывательного управления США. Фактически он будет осуществлять непосредственное руководство управлением, поскольку директору ЦРУ Р. Холмсу, как объявлено, поручено наблюдение за всеми операциями американских органов разведки, включая спецслужбы Пентагона.

Уолтерсу 55 лет. 31 год он провел в военной разведке, из них 24 года за границей. В американской прессе Уолтерса принято именовать «лингвистом» (или «полиглотом») — он владеет французским, русским, немецким, испанским, итальянским, португальским и голландским языками и служил переводчиком Трумэну, Эйзенхауэру и Никсону. Впрочем, «хобби» разведчика не иностранные языки. Он «коллекционирует» военные перевороты. Вот несколько эпизодов из его биографии.

В начале 50-х годов он был назначен помощником военного атташе посольства США в Иране. После переворота, приведшего в 1953 году к свержению правительства Мосаддыка, в прессе промелькнуло сообщение о причастности к нему Уолтерса. Однако к тому времени, когда в 1954 году Иран ратифицировал соглашение с международным консорциумом, по которому иранская

ЗАГОВОРЩИК

нефть надолго попала в руки американских и других нефтяных «королей», самого Уолтерса уже не было в Тегеране — он находился в Аргентине в качестве заместителя военного атташе. Проходит год, и вот группа генералов свергает президента Аргентины Хуана Перона, объявившего о своем намерении поставить нефтяные ресурсы страны под контроль государства.

Крупной вехой в карьере Уолтерса явилась бразильская «акция», на подготовку которой ушло без малого четверть века. Начало истории относится к годам второй мировой войны, когда в форте Ливенворс (штат Канзас) Уолтерс познакомился с юным бразильским офицером, прибывшим в США для стажировки. Офицера звали Кастело Бранко. Вторая встреча произошла в конце войны в Италии, где подполковник Кастело Бранко был начальником штаба бразильского экспедиционного корпуса, а кадровый разведчик Уолтерс — офицером связи при Эйзенхауэре.

1 апреля 1964 года генерал Кастело Бранко, начальник генерального штаба сухопутных сил Бразилии, возглавил переворот, свергнувший президента Гуларта, который решительно проводил в жизнь лозунг «Нефть — наша (то есть бразильская)!» Полковник Вернон Уолтерс занимал в апреле 1964 года пост военного атташе посольства США в Бразилии. В том же месяце он был произведен в генералы...

И. СКИБА

2. «За рубежом» № 19.

continued

such situations, the introduction of additional species can only temporarily increase the diversity and, over a period of time, the number of species present can be expected to drop back to its original level. This means that a species that has been introduced or has migrated into a new area may either survive in its new home by eliminating a species already there (its ecological equivalent) or it may meet so much resistance by the native species that it will be unable to establish itself.

In the advent of a sea-level canal across Panama, we may expect that, over the years, several thousand Atlantic species of shallow water, marine animals will succeed in reaching the Eastern Pacific and vice versa. Since these thousands of species that would be coming into contact for the first time are, for the most part, distinct from one another, we may expect that they would tend to enter into competition rather than hybridizing. Considering that the tropical Western Atlantic has a richer fauna than the Eastern Pacific, it can be predicted, in accordance with the two principles stated above, that the Atlantic species would prove to be the better competitors and would eventually eliminate their Eastern Pacific relatives.

It is the prospect of a huge and irrevocable loss of perhaps thousands of species native to the Eastern Pacific that constitutes the major biological problem presented by the Panama sea-level canal. In contrast, the fauna of the Western Atlantic may remain relatively little affected. However, there do exist in the Eastern Pacific a number of marine animals that originally came from the Indo-West Pacific, the largest and most diverse of all the tropical Regions. Among them are such animals as the poisonous sea-snake, *Pelamis platurus*, and the crown-of-thorns starfish, *Acanthaster planci*. It is expected that these animals would be capable of migrating through a salt-water canal and, once having gained access to the Atlantic, would establish themselves in that ocean.

Although it is very difficult for the biologist to accurately predict the results of invasion by a given animal species, many cases are known where the invader has undergone enormous population increases. The probability of such a population explosion by an introduced species appears to be greatly increased in areas where there are no native species occupying similar niches. At present there are no sea snakes in the Atlantic so the fish species there have not had to cope with this kind of predator. In a like manner, the coral species, that have built up the extensive coral reefs that are found from Florida to Brazil, have not been exposed to the actions of a voracious coral predator such as the crown-of-thorns starfish.

A small-scale example of what may happen when a new kind of predator gains access to a virgin area was provided by the sea lamprey, *Petromyzon marinus*, when it migrated through the Welland Canal to reach the western Great Lakes. The lamprey underwent a rapid population increase and decimated the native lake trout and whitefish populations. The damage to the commercial fisheries for the latter two species amounted to several million dollars and the United States and Canada had to spend additional millions in order to bring the lamprey under control.

There is no other place in the world where a single engineering project would be likely to have such drastic biological effects. Once a unique animal species disappears from the face of the earth it is gone forever and no amount of recrimination can replace it. Do we owe it to ourselves and our posterity to preserve as much of our natural heritage as possible? If so, let us consider very carefully the biological as well as the economic consequences of building a sea-level canal.

AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE

When conservationists find it necessary to object to some engineering projects for ecological reasons they, more often than not, find themselves in the purely negative position of objecting to something without being able to offer any feasible alternatives. Fortunately, in the case of the Panama sea-level canal proposal, there is an attractive, simple, and economical alternative. The Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan, now before Congress, has several distinct advantages: (1) we would still have a freshwater canal that would prevent migrations by marine animals, (2) capacity would be increased enough to provide 35,000 annual transits, about the same number that would be permitted by a sea-level canal, (3) no new treaties would be required since all the construction would take place in the Canal Zone which is already owned and controlled by the United States, and (4) the cost would be about \$850 million compared to \$2.88 billion for a sea-level structure.

COMPREHENSIVE OIL POLICY

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, too often, countries make policy in bits and pieces, reacting from one crisis to the next. If we do not take positive action immediately to solve the energy crisis facing our Nation, we will find ourselves in more than an ordinary crisis. A policy anything less than comprehensive will not avert the great difficulty we will encounter if we do not plan now for the energy needs of the late 1970's and 1980's.

Marilyn Berger, a writer for the Washington Post, authored an article for last Sunday's Post outlining many of the difficult choices facing policymakers regarding foreign supplies of oil. The Middle East produced 1 million barrels of oil for use by the United States in 1970; by 1980, that figure will probably grow to between 8 and 10 million barrels. A successful policy will require very delicate diplomacy. We will be dealing with countries in the Middle East and South America which are proud of their independence and protective of their resources.

A coherent foreign policy emphasizing diplomacy must soon be established to guide our dealings with oil-producing nations. Marilyn Berger's article is a useful summary of the issues we will be facing in developing such a path. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

OIL, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ENERGY CRISIS (By Marilyn Berger)

Two decades ago, when the demand for oil in this country was a fraction of what it is today, the United States was sufficiently worried about the government of oil-rich Iran to have a CIA sponsor a coup there. Today, with U.S. imports of Middle East oil rising—and with projections suggesting that 30 to 40 per cent of U.S. consumption will have to come from that unstable area by 1985—Washington faces the probable nationalization of all American oil companies there within a decade.

The takeovers are expected to be made by governments more or less friendly, more or less "reliable" and with compensation that is more or less satisfactory. And the United States, with its "lowered profile" abroad, is

not likely to be sponsoring any similar coups. The question of what the country can do is being widely debated in government and industry circles, especially since we are headed for an energy crisis.

While there are many ideas for alleviating the potential crisis by developing new sources of power, for the next decade and a half, in the words of one government consultant, there is "nothing but oil." And with domestic production having peaked, much of it will have to come from abroad. This is causing concern in dozens of government bureaus dealing in both foreign and domestic affairs and is currently the subject of a House committee hearing.

At the Commerce Department a major concern is the impact on the U.S. balance of payments. If current projections are correct, says Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson, the deficit on oil alone "could be \$8 billion by 1975 and \$15 billion by 1980."

State Department and Pentagon officials worry about the security of supplies from Arab countries that are in continuing confrontation with Israel. A day could come, they say, when the Arabs might act more forcefully on the proverb that the friend of their enemy is their enemy. Probably even more worrisome to them is the increasing Soviet influence in the Arab world.

The Treasury Department is concerned about the oil tax structure, the Interior Department about the development of alternate sources in shale and tar sands and on the continental shelf, and environmentalists are worrying even more about what that development would mean to the quality of American life.

"STUDYING IT TO DEATH"

It seems safe to say there is no basic raw material which so deeply affects American interests, domestic and foreign. It is unlikely that there is any industry that has had greater success in winning congressional support for its interests or greater entree into the highest levels of government, making any tampering with the existing system especially difficult during a presidential election year.

Perhaps this is one reason why everybody is talking about the energy crunch but nobody is doing much to solve it. As one lawyer working with a number of oil companies remarks: "They're studying it to death . . . The problem in the government now is that there are 43 agencies involved with energy."

The number 43 is not exaggeration; Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton put the number at 61. Not only are studies being made by most of these agencies, but there are almost as many solutions as studies.

The State Department, in a still-secret report, has taken something of a lead in urging the government to take foreign and domestic actions ranging from development of alternatives to auto transportation to changing oil and gas price structures. So far no action has been taken on the study.

The President on June 4, 1971, sent Congress a message on energy resources. This, however, looks mainly toward a solution to problems in the 1980s and beyond and touches only peripherally on the oil shortage that's almost here.

The environmentalists suggest a solution that is attractive in its simplicity: Use less. "A lot of our energy problems will be solved if we stop doing what we're doing," says Stewart Udall, former Secretary of the Interior. "The country should look at its own resources and play the hand it was dealt. . . . For environmentalists the gut reaction is to slow things down."

In fact, virtually every solution to the oil supply problem creates difficulties for the environmentalists. If the United States is to import more oil—which the experts say it must—more and bigger tankers, deeper ports

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during the fiscal year 1973 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 1075

At the request of Mr. CASE, the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENSON), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), were added as cosponsors of amendment No. 1075 to the bill (S. 3200) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF HEARINGS BY DISTRICT COMMITTEE ON NOMINATIONS TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CITY COUNCIL

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I wish to announce that a public hearing will be held on Wednesday morning, April 19, at 9 a.m. in room 6226, New Senate Office Building, on the nominations of Mr. John A. Nevius to be Chairman of the District of Columbia City Council, and Mr. Sterling Tucker, to be Vice Chairman of the Council. Persons wishing to present testimony before the Committee should contact Mr. Robert Harris, Staff Director, D.C. Committee, room 6222, New Senate Office Building, before the close of business on April 18, 1972.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

LONG OVERDUE BOMBING

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I take this occasion to express publicly my great admiration for President Nixon for the courage he has shown in finally taking the steps so necessary to bringing about a quick end to the war in Indochina and a speedy return of Americans held prisoner in that conflict.

It seems to me that in bombing military targets in Haiphong and around Hanoi the United States has at long last spoken to the North Vietnamese and their Soviet suppliers in the only kind of language they understand.

What happened in Vietnam is very clear to anyone who wants to look behind the headlines of some liberal pub-

lications and discount the interpretations of some of our more liberal commentators. In effect, the events of the past 2 weeks have been comparable to the events that occurred in June 1950, when the North Koreans invaded the South and in October 1962, when the Soviets made an attempt to place long-range missiles on the nearby island of Cuba.

The Communist invasion—I might say the massive Communist invasion—of South Vietnam by troops of the Hanoi government, armed with equipment sent to them from Russia, was another instance of the Soviet Union attempting to alter the world balance of power by remote control.

The Soviets called for one of two things by encouraging the invasion of South Vietnam, first, the complete capitulation of the South Vietnamese Government and her American backers or, second, an all-out attempt to end the ceaseless supplying of Hanoi with the equipment needed to kill more Americans and more of America's allies.

I notice that some of our liberal publications are already saying that President Nixon has taken the United States to the "brink" of a head-on confrontation with the Soviet Union. The situation is just the opposite. The Soviet Union, by supplying and encouraging the Communist invasion across the DMZ, took events in Indochina to the brink of a head-on collision with the United States.

Mr. President, we are in a war, and we have been ever since President Kennedy sent troops to South Vietnam with orders to return enemy fire if necessary. Things cannot always be cozy and comfortable and safe in the conduct of a war. We know that from long, long experience. We have tried the easy way, we have tried to win our point in Vietnam in a way that would not endanger one Soviet supply ship or cause the Kremlin planners one lost night's sleep. It has not worked in any respect. All it has done has been to prolong the war and to convince the Soviets that the United States did not have the will nor the determination to do what was required to fulfill our commitment.

Well, Mr. President, I for one, am happy that the time of pussyfooting and cowering to every Soviet threat is over. We hear a lot about the risks run by the President in ordering the bombing of supply dumps and other targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. There is no denying this. Every single thing a major power does in the conduct of a war involves risk of some kind. But unless we are willing to back our foreign commitments with decisive action, the ultimate risk will be to freedom everywhere in the world. Surely President Nixon took a risk, and I thank God that he had the courage to take it before it was too late.

The tragedy of the situation is that this kind of decisive action was not taken 8 or 10 years ago—at a time when it would have settled the situation in Indochina once and for all and without the heavy cost to the United States in lives, money, and material that it has extracted.

CITIZEN EXCHANGE CORPS

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I wish to commend the Citizen Exchange Corps for its sustained service in bringing about greater understanding between the U.S.S.R. and ourselves. There is a citizen-to-citizen counterpart program involving visits to the Soviet Union and private meetings with persons there who have similar interests to visiting Americans. Historically, the Soviets have reciprocated and the Citizen Exchange Corps has done an extensive job of hosting visiting Russians in a nonofficial effective fashion. In short, it has credibility on both sides and its contacts with Soviet citizens are probably wider than any other groups, private or public.

With this record behind it and the likelihood of holding a "World Congress" in Moscow during 1973 on the subject of international education and private citizen exchanges the CEC has launched yet another effort—a "China Corps." Similarly, the idea here is to promote private exchange visits between citizens of the Peoples Republic of China and our own citizens in the interest of peaceful coexistence and increased understanding. Accordingly, CEC has "enrolled" hundreds of interested U.S. citizens who would travel to China when that becomes possible. As is the case of CEC visitors to the U.S.S.R., these persons will be nonpolitical persons from all walks of life but will include interpreters and professors who will work in cooperation with their host country counterparts to arrange lectures, discussions and counterpart visits to homes, educational institutions, industries, and the like.

The idea is a good one—and like most good ideas, deceptively simple. As a longtime advocate of normalizing relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic, I hope others will join me in applauding the new CEC initiative and wish them well in this enterprise.

ENERGY AND POWER CRISIS

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, at long last the news media of this area—even the Washington Post and the New York Times—have recognized the existence of an energy crisis in the United States.

Heretofore, the oil news coverage in these two great newspapers was concerned mostly with what some of the perennial detractors of the petroleum industry were saying about the oil import program, natural gas shortage, antitrust hearings, depletion allowance and pollution but very little about the true facts of an energy shortage.

Suddenly, and certainly to their credit, both of these newspapers have seen the light and devoted many columns of news coverage to the growing dependence of this Nation on foreign sources of energy. Oil and gas furnish more than three-fourths of all our energy demands which, in spite of anything we can do, will continue to increase and for the next 10 to 15 years must be met principally with oil and gas.

Mr. President, I plan to discuss the

Oil, Foreign Policy And the Energy Crisis

STATINTL

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

TWO DECADES AGO, when the demand for oil in this country was a fraction of what it is today, the United States was sufficiently worried about the government of oil-rich Iran to have the CIA sponsor a coup there. Today, with U.S. imports of Middle East oil rising—and with projections suggesting that 30 to 40 per cent of U.S. consumption will have to come from that unstable area by 1985—Washington faces the probable nationalization of all American oil companies there within a decade.

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While there are many ideas for alleviating the potential crisis by developing new sources of power, for the next decade and a half, in the words of one government consultant, there is "nothing but oil." And with domestic production having peaked, much of it will have to come from abroad. This is causing concern in dozens of government bureaus dealing in both foreign and domestic affairs and is currently the subject of a House committee hearing.

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In fact, virtually every solution to the oil supply problem creates difficulties for the environmentalists. If the United States is to import more oil—which the experts say it must—more and bigger tankers, deeper ports and more refineries will be needed. The environmentalists like none of these, out of concern for oil spills and air pollution. To produce more domestic oil means offshore drilling, shale development, new pipelines, which again bring with them the prospects of spills, sludge disposal and potential ecological imbalance.

They Can't Drink It

EVEN IF DOMESTIC oil is developed, however, the Middle East will remain important for some time as an energy supply for this country. Imports from the Middle East in 1970 amounted to 1 million barrels

The big ones, like ITT, fly flags of many nations

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

See the great tanker gliding majestically into harbor.

It is one fifth of a mile long. It was built in Japan for a German syndicate and brings Middle East oil to a New Jersey refinery on long-term lease to a Dutch oil company, flying a Panamanian flag. The master is a Swede, it is manned by a Hong Kong crew — a short-term operation financed by New York banks and insured by Lloyds of London.

What nationality is this?

It symbolizes the new multi-national, multi-billion dollar corporate world suddenly illuminated like unfamiliar objects in a room where somebody has struck a match — the accidental misadventures of the huge ITT.

ITT has been growing and expanding, for years, a conglomerate with 70 companies, operating in 50 countries, with about 30 percent of its income from abroad. Amid the 20 biggest industrial corporations in the world, ITT ranks 13. General Motors ranks first.

The measure of concentration

A congressional estimate is that the 300 world's largest corporations now produce one-sixth of the earth's total industrial output and that by the year 2000 they will produce one-half. How long this process of concentration will go on and where it will end, nobody knows.

These big corporations often have their own foreign policies aided and abetted by the chancelleries of their respective governments whose duty it is, in part, to promote their health and welfare.

Take General Motors, the granddaddy of them all. Senate committees now plan to investigate the unknown feudal world of international conglomerates.

Private studies already exist. A study by Richard J. Barber, "The American Corporation," notes that GM, with 1,300,000 stockholders, employs 750,000 foreign and U.S. workers, with 45 plants in 24 countries. Its

total cash wages are more than twice the personal income of Ireland.

Is it a corporation or an independent power?

The giant ITT is charged on the basis of alleged memos coming into the possession of columnist Jack Anderson with collaborating with the CIA to block the coming to power of President Salvador Allende of Chile in 1970. U.S. Ambassador Edward M. Korry "finally received a message from the State Department giving him the green light to move in the name of President Nixon," according to one document; this allegedly representing "maximum authority to do all possible — short of a Dominican-type action — to keep Allende from taking power."

No official here will do other than deny the charge, which is creating a sensation in Latin America.

The Senate Foreign Relations committee is making plans to examine the matter. But whatever the validity of this particular allegation, there is a widespread belief that these huge commercial empires are a new factor in world affairs. They have an interest, in less-advanced nations, to reach an accommodation with the powers that be and, after reaching such an arrangement, trying to maintain the status quo.

This, it is argued, explains why around the world, the United States Government often seems to be trying to prop up a junta, strong man, or dictator, protecting its national interests against an insurrection from below often instituted by radical reform groups.

Business side noted

At the same time, supporters of the big companies would argue that they have helped raise standards of living in developing nations — and that in richer countries they have provided employment and generated business.

Europeans have also noted the internationalization of business, because they are often the target for U.S. penetration.

"The third industrial power, after the United States and the Soviet Union, could easily be in 15 years not Europe, but American industry in Europe," wrote Jacques Servan-Schreiber in his book "The American Challenge."

Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D) of Connecticut, chairman of a subcommittee on interna-

tional trade, puts combined sales of multinational corporations of \$300 billion. "It is absolutely essential to know more about this new phenomenon," he says.

ITT is 13th among the world's giants. Its president gets a salary three times Mr. Nixon's. Although ITT's interests run from the Sheraton Corporation and Continental Baking to the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, it does a majority of its business outside the U.S.

\$12 billion in 1969

In 1969 American companies spent an estimated \$12 billion on new plant and equipment in foreign countries, so much that American organized labor looked at it jealously and charged it with exporting jobs.

• Ford at present makes 40 percent of its cars outside the U.S., Chrysler 30 percent GM 25 percent.

• On the average, America's world companies are five times larger than the leading British and German corporations and 10 times larger than the French.

• Another item: There are 1,600 U.S. owned companies in England, which account for 10 percent of the country's industrial output.

New to man in the street

Business writers watch these trends with awe but till the ITT affair the man in the street paid little heed:

"What is taking shape, slowly and tentatively but nevertheless unmistakably," said Fortune magazine editorially, "is 'on world' of business, a world in which business will truly know no frontiers. . . ."

Inevitably foreign policy marches in step with business. The two are intertwined. American oil firms have an enormous stake in the Middle East. America's tax and oil import quotas are based upon international realities.

Studies of the CIA argue that it played major part in events abroad; for example, the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, and again in the overthrow of the left of center Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954.

Charges like these are so common that they are widely rumored and believed after many crises as, for example, the latest charge about ITT in Chile.

Iran Maintains Trial Secrecy

Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, March 11—The Iranian government has banned all foreign journalists and jurists from attending a continuing series of political trials despite serious indications of torture and procedural irregularities, according to a French lawyer who recently returned from Teheran.

The decision, reported by Christian Bourguet who visited Iran for the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, appeared to diminish the chances of clemency for 10 defendants who have been condemned to death and await execution.

Ten men have been executed since the trials began in late January, and a total of 143 defendants are expected to be judged before the military tribunal is scheduled to adjourn next month.

Moreover, pleas for clemency expressed in the French press—running the gamut of opinion from pro-government *Le Figaro* to the Communist Party's *L'Humanite*—appear to have been counter-productive, judging by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's angry remarks earlier this week.

"We can neither accept any outsider's interference in our domestic affairs, nor gratuitous criticism which is not only far from the truth, but indeed contrary to the truth," he told visiting West German correspondents accompanying Chancellor Willy Brandt.

The defendants belong to four separate groups which have launched campaigns of violent opposition, saying the shah's regime is incapable of reform.

They are: the National Liberation Movement, an outcropping of old religious and patriotic sentiments which animated Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, who nationalized Iranian oil in 1951 only to be overthrown with CIA help in 1953; Maoists affiliated with a breakaway faction of the outlawed pro-Moscow Tudeh Communist Party; self-proclaimed Communist revolutionaries accused of a bank robbery, and the "Siakhal

Group" of rural guerrillas, accused of having killed five policemen, five gendarmes, a secret police agent, a banker and a magistrate.

The defendants are charged with a variety of politically motivated crimes ranging from murder, bank robbery, attempted kidnapping, attacks on police stations to illegal theft and skyjacking and possession of duplicating machines.

Bourguet's mission was preceded by that of French lawyers Henri Libertalis and Nuri Albala, representing Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of the Rights of Man and the International Secretariat of Catholic Jurists.

Taken together, these reports note that despite constitutional guarantees that political crimes must be tried before a civilian court with a jury, all such cases are, in fact, handled by military tribunals.

Civilian lawyers were not allowed to plead before these military courts, and indeed members of the bar were obliged to give active or retired army officers crash courses in law to permit them to represent the accused, according to the reports.

Prisoners were held by Savak, the security police, for periods far exceeding the statutory 24-hour delay before they are to be presented to the courts for indictment, the reports said.

Even in the preliminary hearings, which are held in secret, the accused have no legal representative. Before the court itself, the reports said, alleged confessions are not questioned, evidence said to be in the prosecution dossier is not contested, and the defense lawyers show little interest in their clients, sometimes spending no more than five minutes in pleading on behalf of men facing the death penalty.

Albala noted that during a military tribunal session which he attended Feb. 6 defendant Masud Amadzadeh "suddenly pulled off his

sweater in front of everyone and showed me appalling burns on his stomach and back."

When Albala and Libertalis later that day were allowed to meet two defendants, Nasser Sadegh and Ali Mihandoust, in Tehran's Evine Prison the lawyers asked whether they had been beaten.

Sadegh, who spoke in English, replied, "no, toasted." Albala quoted him as saying that four other defendants "had been burned by being placed on a table which was then heated to white heat" by the security police.

Sadegh said that one of the men thus tortured, named Ashgar Badizadeghan, "since then had been paralyzed in the lower limbs and could only move by crawling forward using his upper arms.

Bourguet recounted his meeting with Dr. Baqer Ameli, the chairman of the Iranian Committee on the Rights of Man. Ameli earlier has sent a letter to the Paris newspaper *Le Monde* denying charges of torture that an escaped Iranian political prisoner Reza Rezai had made in its columns.

Ameli told Bourguet that despite the constitutional guarantee for jury trial in cases of political offenses "a military court has never accepted a jury." Ameli said that no protest was possible now since his committee had not protested when the law, which also set up the security police, was promulgated in 1957.

Since all the accused claimed to have confessed only under torture, Bourguet asked why Ameli had not protested especially in the light of Albala's findings. Ameli conceded that "it was true the accused said they had been tortured, but there was no proof that the wounds were not incurred before their arrest. We cannot protest against torture which has not been proven."

In his description of torture published by *Le Monde*, Rezai said Savak agents were trained "according to Israeli and American methods" and that "Israeli and American advisers were working to perfect the most effective (torture) methods."

The worst torture, he recounted, is meted out in the 24 hours following arrest; prisoners are beaten with a whip made out of electrical cables and are worked over by judo

STATINTL

A Short History of CIA Intervention in Sixteen Foreign Countries

In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act provided the Agency with five principal duties:

1. To advise the National Security Council on matters concerning intelligence.
2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intelligence matters.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and disseminate it to other government departments.
4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."
5. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC would direct."

In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, allowing the agency to disregard laws that required disclosure of information concerning the organization, to expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures with no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to make contracts and purchases without advertising.

With such unprecedented authority, with unlimited access to money, with liberty to act without regard to scrutiny or review by either civilian or governmental organizations, the CIA has become a self-contained state. One observer ranks the CIA as the fourth world power, after the U.S., Russia, and China.

Partly because of the CIA's special "secret" status and partly because of the laziness of the press, the total history of CIA intervention in foreign countries has never been reported. What you read instead are fragments—an attempted bribe in Mexico last July, an assassination in Africa last November.

What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's record is as erratic and contradictory as that of any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit murder, defoliation and drug addiction for political ends. Look at the record:



Iran seeks supremacy in Gulf

By Barry Rubin

As the U.S. and British empires have weakened, it has become necessary for the imperialist countries to find subcontractor nations all over the world to help bear the burden—and profits—of neo-colonialism.

A number of such franchises have been already given out: Thailand in Southeast Asia, Brazil in Latin America, the Republic of South Africa in Africa, Israel in the Middle East and now Iran in the Arab (Persian) Gulf region.

The Arab Gulf is one of the world's most vital strategic areas. Over 58 percent of the world's oil reserves are found in this zone which furnished one-third of 1971 world oil production. Some 45 million people live around the Gulf; two-thirds of them Iranian and the remaining one-third are Arab.

Despite the rich oil deposits of these countries, the people still live in primitive conditions, mostly as nomadic and semi-nomadic herders and as subsistence peasants. Much of the area is still under medieval social structures.

In Oman, for instance, until very recently, the sheik prohibited all travel within the country, the building of new houses or the repair of old ones, smoking in public, movies, newspapers and political discussion. There were only three primary schools in the country and no secondary schools. Women were required to wear veils and chattel slavery continued to exist.

U.S., British oil hegemony

Petroleum in the Gulf region is controlled by U.S. and British companies. U.S. interests, which rule 54 percent of oil concessions, have centered on Iran and Saudi Arabia; the British hold 30 percent of the total oil, mostly in the Arab emirates along the south shore of the Gulf.

The recent changes in the power relationships were triggered to a great extent by Britain's decision to withdraw most of its military forces from this region by the end of 1971. This marked a transition from direct colonialism, through which England has dominated the Gulf for the last 150 years, to neo-colonialism.

In preparation for their departure, the British engineered coups in Oman and Abu Dhabi—installing mildly reformist regimes—and set up the Union of Arab Emirates, composed of British puppet mini-states.

England hoped to set up a string of governments strong enough to maintain "stability" in the area. As the London Times editorialized in March 1969, "It certainly seems to be the case that the British hope to be able to achieve militarily after 1971 what they achieve now through the presence of 6000 troops. Their proxies would be local forces commanded and equipped to British standards."

But this plan was foiled by the activity of the Dhofar Liberation Front, now part of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). The Front started guerrilla warfare against the British and their puppet government in 1965 in Dhofar, the large, mountainous southern province of Oman. The rebels, supported by the People's Republic of Yemen and China, have now liberated 90 percent of Dhofar and threaten to spread the liberation war to the rest of the Gulf.

At first, the British tried to smash the insurrection with military advisors and political maneuvering. A special Green Beret-style British unit was set up, the Special Air Service, to help run the sultan's 6000-man army. Col. Hugh Oldman, a British officer, was sent to become the sultan's defense secretary and about 100 other British officers were placed under his command. English air force bases, maintained despite the announced withdrawal, were set up at Salalah and on Masira Island to give air support to the sultan's forces. Although officially the British government had repeatedly announced that their soldiers were in Oman only as advisors, they were forced to admit Jan. 1 (because of high casualties among their forces) that English troops were directly involved in the fighting.

British political strategy proved no more effective against the liberation forces than did their military tactics. The old sultan had been extremely reactionary. Not only were newspapers, radio and

electricity prohibited but the very word "revolution" had been banned from the language and replaced by the word "disobedience." Omani school children, for example, were taught about the "American Disobedience" of 1776. To protect their 18 million tons of oil per year, Britain replaced the old sultan with his "liberal" son, Qabus bin Said, in July 1970. Qabus is a graduate of the British military training school, Sandhurst.

Still, the liberation forces continue to make progress both in Dhofar and the more populated regions of Oman.

As Britain has moved out of the Gulf, the U.S. has moved in. The number of U.S. warships in the area has increased, military aid to Iran and Saudi Arabia has been stepped up and new U.S. bases have been established.

On Dec. 23 the U.S. signed an agreement with Bahrain, a strategically located island kingdom in the Gulf, to take over the former British base there. The excuse used for the establishment of the base was "to have a counterweight to the growing Soviet interest in the area."

The same type of rationale has been used to justify the recent movements of the American fleet into the Indian Ocean and the establishment of a U.S. base at Diego Garcia. Most U.S. activity in the area, however, has been directed toward shoring up its allies Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Iran especially has been put forward as the imperialist candidate for hegemony over the Gulf. The shah's repressive government has been quick to accept the nomination—the recent \$100 million celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire being a sort of massive kick-off dinner for the Iranian chauvinistic campaign. The Iranian government also took out a full-page ad in the New York Times, devoted to a historical justification for calling the Arab Gulf the "Persian" Gulf, Persia being the ancient name for Iran.

Iran—the candidate

Certainly, Iran is a logical choice for this role. It is the most populous country bordering the Gulf and it also has the longest border with it, 600 miles. It has also been relatively prosperous in recent years. The gross national product is increasing at an annual rate of 12 percent and it has begun new industries in iron-smelting, copper-mining and in petro-chemicals. Iran's harbors have recently been improved to handle more of the tanker traffic traveling down the Gulf which supplies 70 percent of Western Europe's and much of Japan's oil. Iran also produces 4.6 million barrels of oil daily on its own and last year took in \$1 billion as its share of oil revenues.

Up until fairly recently Iran had been dominated by British oil interests. But in 1951 Prime Minister Mossadegh nationalized the British holdings. He was overthrown by a CIA-organized coup after which the British were forced to take second place to American corporations.

When Britain pulled out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the CIA worked to ferret out details of the sanction-busting. In the popular traditions of spying, secret documents disappeared were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock when one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was not until the CIA had expanded into an area where the British were not active in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his column and looks at the Director, Richard Helms

DEAD LETTERS IN SALISBURY

MANY of the bright young men Allen Dulles had recruited to CIA from law offices and universities had gained their spurs in London, where they were sent to glean some of the methods of the British Secret Intelligence Service. Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks about the Victorian and Indian Army traditions still surviving in the British secret service, but he had a healthy respect for its unrivalled experience and great professionalism. He knew that CIA could learn a lot from the British about operations in the Middle East and Africa, where its stations were rapidly expanding.

After Archibald Roosevelt, one of CIA's foremost "Arabists", had restored cordial relations with SIS when station head in London, a plan of co-operation was devised for Africa, where most of the former British colonies had gained independence, and were becoming subject to strong Soviet and Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia made her momentous "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI), which led to the conflict with the British Government.

There is no better instance of the strengthening of CIA-SIS collaboration than the hitherto undisclosed story of the services CIA rendered the British authorities in Rhodesia, particularly since about 1968.

Indeed, in assisting the British SIS in its thankless task of implementing the policy of economic sanctions against the Smith regime, CIA put its relations with the Portuguese in jeopardy. It has an enduring understanding with the Portuguese Government and its PIDE secret service on many aspects: NATO security, anti-communist operations, the use of radio stations in Portugal and her colonies, and of bases for the U-2 spy planes and Special Forces in Angola, Mozambique and Macao. However thin the

British sanction policy became, British consular offices and SIS men were supposed to watch the steady flow of Rhodesian pig-iron, tobacco, and other products through the Portuguese ports of Lorenzo Marques and Beira in East Africa to Europe and the Far East. Merchants and shippers there had made fortunes out of the traffic which the Portuguese were bound, by United Nations resolutions and agreements with Britain, to regard as illegal.

After the closure of British missions in Salisbury all information about Rhodesian exports dried up at source. At this juncture CIA stepped in to assist the British. It was not merely a labour of love. American tobacco syndicates in Virginia, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky greatly increased their production and sales to Europe when Rhodesian tobacco growers lost most of their trade through sanctions. Traditionally, Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Switzerland. When these supplies dried up, European manufacturers turned to American growers. But by and by Rhodesian exports began to flow again, by the use of false certificates of origin and smuggling through the Portuguese ports and through Durban in South Africa, much to the displeasure of the Americans.

Thus, obliging the British and helping American business, CIA ordered its agents to ferret out the secrets of the sanction-busting schemes devised by Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA station in Salisbury was bustling with activity. Since 1962 it had been headed by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA official, who had joined it in 1952 from the U.S. Development Aid Agency.

Other CIA men were Cape Town, former Ambassador Francis M. Bunker, who had a cloak-and-dagger reputation in Cuba and Congo and several others. Edward Salisbury.

From 1957 from the State Department; from 1959 he headed the East and South African section and, at the time of his new appointment, was Station Head in Pretoria. Among his various exploits he was reputed to have initiated the first contacts between the South African government and Dr Banda of Malawi.

The CIA agents were perpetually journeying between Salisbury and the Mozambique ports, and Murray was temporarily posted to Lusaka to maintain personal contact with British officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign affairs as well as security and the secret service of the Rhodesian regime, were not unaware of the unwelcome operations of the Americans. They suffered them for the sake of avoiding an open clash with Washington. Their patience, however, became frayed when it was discovered that secret documents had disappeared from the headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian National Front Party. Subsequently,

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Outside View

America's Empire

by Claude Julien

translated from the French

by Renaud Bruce

(Pantheon; \$10)

With the United States in the midst of an extended debate on our role in the world, we badly need outside perspectives on what the American role has been and should be. Unfortunately this volume by the foreign editor of *Le Monde* adds little to the critiques previously presented by the American new left.

More than a third of it is taken up with a history of American expansionism prior to the Second World War. The remainder of the book deals successively with what he calls the "economic, military and culture empires," the role of the CIA, and finally the decline of the empire. Particularly in the economics chapter he seems to be arguing that economics is the sole driving motive of empire. Nowhere does he come to grips with the multiplicity of interests and stands which come to bear on any American foreign policy decision.

In his chapter on the CIA Julien breaks the monotony by presenting an interesting case study of the American intervention in Iran in 1953 to drive Mossadegh from power. He shows clearly the depth of American involvement in this episode, presenting a quite different Mossadegh from that given to the American people by Washington at the time and by Eisenhower in his *Memoirs*, namely a Mossadegh who was a tool of international communism. Julien paints Mossadegh as a nationalist trying to get Iran a fair share of oil revenues.

Chiefly, *America's Empire*, fails to deal with how decisions are made and actions taken by the American government, leading to the omission of perhaps the least understood aspect of American post-war interventionism, the

ways in which the military have influenced American policy. The military on the whole have resisted the commitment of American forces at odd places around the world, pleading lack of capability and the need to maintain forces to defend Europe. On the other hand the Joint Chiefs' requirements for bases, overflight rights and allied forces have played a key role in making policy, and that policy has been mostly to keep us committed or extend our commitments. Thus it was the military desire to have unfettered control of the former Japanese Pacific island colonies that led Truman to back away from insistence on Trusteeships for Indochina. Similarly, JCS requirements, accepted by civilian leaders, led to the American base structure in Japan, and to German and Japanese rearmament. The last could be extended indefinitely.

The disappointment that one has with this book comes from the urgency and importance of the topic. What has the United States done in the world? Why? What should we do? How? These questions cry out for national debate in which the critical view of outsiders could be very beneficial. We will not get very far if supporters of past policies emphasize our good intentions and critics bemoan what we have done. Mr. Julien does the latter but he is neither insightful nor persuasive.

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EMBASSY PICKETED

Protesters Here Hit Shah's Rule

By BETTY JAMES
Star Staff Writer

With their faces hidden by masks, some 100 persons yesterday protested with speeches, chants and slogans the regime of the Shah of Iran, who this week is celebrating the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire.

While the Shah hosts world leaders at Persepolis, the city of the empire's founder, Cyrus the Great, the protesters, who said they were Iranian students, insisted that "a hungry nation does not need a 2,500-year celebration."

The picture of an oppressive, murderous government presented at a press conference in the yard of George Washington University was different from that of American observers who have praised Iran as the success story of the Middle East and the Shah as a monarch who in a peaceful revolution — the "white revolution" — has brought stability and economic well-being to his people.

The Iranian Embassy later commented that the students were heedless of reforms in their country, including "land reform, suffrage for women, redistribution of income (and) the development of the Literacy and the Health Corps" since 1963.

The embassy contended that only about 50 Iranian students were present at the rally, which was followed by a chanting march to the embassy.

The students said they were wearing the masks to protect them from identification by the SAVAK, the Iranian secret police who, they asserted, are

everywhere. The masks were lettered, "Political Repression in Iran — Shah is a U.S. Puppet."

Besides talks from the event's co-sponsors — the Iranian Students Association and the Organization of Arab Students — and representatives of radical-left youth groups, the featured speakers were Richard Cottam, professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh and author of "Nationalism in Iran," published in 1964, and journalist I. F. Stone.

Stone declared that what was really being celebrated this week was the 16th birthday of the control of Iran by the Central Intelligence Agency, not the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire.

In San Francisco, Iranian students yesterday shouted "Death to the Shah" outside their country's consulate, wrecked by a bomb late Thursday night. No one was injured in the blast, which apparently was timed to coincide with the celebration at Persepolis.

would expect, except the

THE DEATH OF LIBERALISM

a radical journalist contends that the old-line liberals—obsessed with cold-war anti-communism, big government and unworkable social programs—have misled and misgoverned america

opinion By JACK HENRIKSEN

He not busy being born is busy dying.
—BOB DYLAN

THE OLD LIBERALISM is busy dying. As a theory, as a tradition, as a set of institutions, as a group of leaders, liberal anti-communism has become a God that failed. Liberals such as Hubert Humphrey and Nelson Rockefeller have become part of the problem—worn-out fig leaves covering the naked emperor's private parts. The New Deal has become the status quo; the old solution has become the new problem.

Let me be precise about who the liberals and the liberal center are: I'm talking about the Peace Corps, the Alsop brothers, the A.D.A. (Americans for Democratic Action), Bayard Rustin, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., *The New York Times*. I'm also talking about the Ford Foundation, the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Ripon Society—all self-proclaimed pillars of liberalism. There is also the liberalism of those "tough-minded" professors such as McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, John Roche and Henry Kissinger, which has become indistinguishable from the kill-ratio logic of the Defense Department computers that predicted the last Viet Cong guerrilla would die 20 months ago. The liberalism of respectable institutions such as *Commentary* magazine, Freedom House and New York's Liberal Party has become a barrier to social change, a dead hand on the present, preventing the liberation of new ideas, new programs, new movements, new myths. After zigzagging ambiguously through the Thirties and Forties, the American electoral left fell off the track entirely about 1950, and we are still paying the backbreaking price.

We are paying that price in a trade-union leadership that stands to the right of *The Wall Street Journal* and the Catholic Church on most public issues. (One cannot help but notice how much the C. I. O. deteriorated after it cleansed itself by purging Reds and radicals in the late Forties.) And we are paying that price in the unnatural isolation of the student, black and anti-war movements of the Sixties, which were forced to start from scratch, bereft of immediate historical fathers.

The crucial point is that during the Fifties, liberalism lost its will to fight and accepted the basic economic and foreign-policy assumptions of the right. And this pulled the center of gravity of American politics decisively away from the left. What has happened these past 20 years is not that the country has grown more conservative but that liberalism has grown more conservative. By failing to organize F. D. R.'s "one third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished," by remaining silent during Joe McCarthy's attack on the Bill of Rights and by getting us into Vietnam, liberalism did the work of the right while claiming to represent the left.

Now we must move beyond and transcend the Cold War liberalism of military intervention (Bay of Pigs, Dominican Republic, Vietnam) by becoming peaceful internationalists once again. And as historians such as Howard Zinn, Christopher Lasch and Staughton Lynd have pointed out, we must go back and rediscover the deeper roots of the indigenous American left in fragments of the Populist, feminist, black, Socialist and Progressive movements of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.

No insurgent movement has ever succeeded that was rooted in hatred of its own country—a fatal mistake of which parts of the New Left (Weathermen, Yippies) are guilty. By retrieving the banner of the left as it was before it was corrupted by the Cold War, we offer the post-linear kids something inside their own nation with which to identify, so they won't have to import exotic fantasy notions of revolution from North Korea or Bolivia. By restoring the old dignity to the Populist attack on monopolies and abusive corporations and banks, we can take liberalism out of the soft suburban living rooms and place it on the side of the workingman—the unskilled factory worker, the waitress, the gas-station attendant, the dishwasher, the taxi driver, the small farmer. And by reconnecting with the old Populist passion for participation and decentralization, we can begin to end centralization. The agrarian Populists had a healthy skepticism of organization and remote power, a skepticism that was

so many fine, formative hours. We are paying that price in a trade-union leadership that stands to the right of *The Wall Street Journal* and the Catholic Church on most public issues. (One cannot help but notice how much the C. I. O. deteriorated after it cleansed itself by purging Reds and radicals in the late Forties.) And we are paying that price in the unnatural isolation of the student, black and anti-war movements of the Sixties, which were forced to start from scratch, bereft of immediate historical fathers.

that in human problems can be solved in Washington if you hire enough experts and bureaucrats and pay for enough Rand Corporation studies.

If something lasting went out of liberalism during the Fifties, then there had to be a deeper reason than just the Cold War, or McCarthyism, or that the unions purged all their rebels. That reason was that the central intellectual formulations of liberal anti-communism were mistaken. I don't say that the liberal leaders of the Fifties were badly motivated or uncommonly corrupt, or that any large numbers were caught in the web of conspiracy woven by the CIA spider. All I argue is that their judgment was bad, and their mistakes have had grievous historical consequences.

They were wrong, first, in their total, fanatical anti-communism, which permitted no possibility for change in the Soviet bloc and blinded them to terrible injustices within their own society and within the so-called Free World. Philosopher Sidney

Hook, the archetypal liberal anti-Communist, was able to write in the *Partisan Review* in 1952: "I cannot understand why American intellectuals should be apologetic about the fact they are limited in their effective historical choice between endorsing a system of total error and critically supporting our own imperfect democratic culture. . . ." That was never the stark either/or choice intellectuals faced. There were always the independent alternatives of democratic radicalism, or neutralism in the Cold War, or support for the great movements against colonialism then being spawned in the womb of the Third World from Cuba to Algeria to Vietnam—movements almost all the NATO intellectuals ignored in their elitist preoccupation with white Western Europe. And one does not make this case now with the cheap wisdom of hindsight. In fact, there were American intellectuals at the time—men such as C. Wright Mills, Dwight MacDonald, Paul Goodman and Norman Mailer—who did resist the tide of fashion and held onto a saving remnant of independent radicalism.

The second conceptual mistake the Fifties liberals made was "the end of ideology" mischief, popularized by Daniel Bell's book bearing that unfortunate axiom. Bell's theory expressed the remarkable idea that all the great structural problems of America had been solved, and all that was required now were small adjustments, some minor technological tinkering with the soft machine at the top.

The foolishness of this notion has been proved many times by the mass

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'Last of the Giants'

Inside Stories From Talks With

This article, on the Central Intelligence Agency, is the third in a series of selections from "The Last of the Giants," a new 4-volume of memoirs of C. L. Sulzberger, foreign affairs columnist of The New York Times.

By C. L. SULZBERGER

Special to The Bulletin

Washington, August 7, 1956

Dined and talked until the early hours with Frank Wisner and Gates Lloyd. They are in the same trade (CIA). Frank said Allen Dulles (then head of the CIA) was extremely upset by my column criticizing American propaganda.

Wisner told me McCarthyism is, unfortunately, by no means dead in the government, and I should not forget this. M, who was suspended from the State Department on a phony, trumped-up charge, was finally forced back by pressure.

But now — two years later — he has been exiled to a consular position at the fever-hole of Paramaribo, (then capital of Dutch Guiana), the nearest post we have to Devil's Island.

Frank told me that he was astonished to discover, when he went to Romania during the war, that practically all the agents furnished by Zaslani (later Reuven Shiloah), Israeli intelligence boss, to the British from Romanian Jews in Palestine, were working for Zaslani's network all the time — and not for the British, who didn't know.

Washington, July 23, 1958

Dined last night at Wisner's. Allen Dulles boasted to me that CIA had been seeing de Gaulle regularly before he came to power, through a French contact. He also said they had an excellent agent among the ultras who plotted in Algeria. Maybe, but it seems indiscreet to say as much.

Officials of the CIA

Washington, July 24, 1958

Dined with Allen Dulles and Senator Fulbright. Tomorrow, Fulbright's committee investigates Dulles's CIA. They were polite and friendly with each other, but Fulbright made no bones about his intentions to make Dulles squirm. He felt CIA should have known more about the Iraqi coup in advance.

The military information and plans of the Bagdad Pact that are now available to Nasser (and Russia?) are admittedly embarrassing.

Dulles thinks the way our intelligence is set up is more logical than Britain's. We have in one organization what they have in three and a half. It is better that way, and better to have the organization known.

Washington, October 12, 1960

This afternoon, saw Allen Dulles in his CIA office. On the wall a map shows the route of the Soviet ICBMs to the Pacific from the general region of Kirghizstan. Allen said the takeoff point was deliberately changed on the map for security reasons.

We talked about Gary Powers. (U-2 spy shot down over Russia). The CIA has a theory that no man should ever be ordered to commit suicide if captured and this was not in contracts with agents.

The CIA thought there was more chance of a man's individual nobility prompting him to such an act if there were no such advance order.

Allen said Powers had done nothing wrong and probably would have had a hard time committing suicide either by

cumbersome pressure suit. Thirdly, he was captured, pronto-on landing.

Dulles' View

Nevertheless, Dulles left me with the impression he thought Powers should somehow have knocked himself off. He said Powers had been brainwashed or brain-conditioned prior to the trial. It was clear he had told the Russians more than emerged, because his previous "testimony" was always referred to.

I gather Dulles is unhappy with Powers' behavior but doesn't like to say so. Powers had a specific, short-term contract with CIA and was paid between \$25,000 and \$30,000 a year, about what a good, civilian jet pilot gets.

Under the law, he must be paid as long as his contract runs, even though in jail. (He was later freed in an exchange.)

Paris, April 19, 1961

Lunched today with Kim (Kermit) Roosevelt. He is now vice president of Gulf Oil Co. in charge of government relations, but he is still linked with the CIA.

Kim was in charge of the operation in Iraq when we got rid of Mossadegh in 1953. That one was relatively easy as we were able to calculate that if we could produce an open fight between Mossadegh and the Shah, the Shah would gain popular support. He did. The British had tried to get up to take the line of intervention many months earlier, but we waited until the local situation was right — unlike Cuba.

Kim was on a secret mission in 1953 with Bob Anderson, later Eisenhower's secretary

of the Treasury. The mission, sent out by Eisenhower himself, sought to try and make peace between Egypt and Israel. Anderson and Kim talked to Nasser hour after hour. There was a corollary mission to Ben Gurion.

Chet Bowles (then under secretary of state) offered Kim these ambassadorial posts; Tehran, Cairo, and Rabat. Kim pointed out that he could not go to Iran because the Russians had evidence of what his activities had been in overthrowing Mossadegh in 1953. Likewise, Kim told Bowles it would be useless to send him to Cairo.

At the time of the Iraqi revolution, Nasser sent a team into Bagdad which grabbed all the Bagdad Pact intelligence files — well filled with Kim's name.

Were Kim to be our ambassador, Nasser would be in a position to blackmail him and us by releasing such documents whenever convenient.

Palestinians gain in Jordan war

STATINTL

By A. Tartini

King Hussein's attempt to crush the fedayeen in Jordan ended unsuccessfully in a cease-fire arranged Sept. 25 by Sudanese President Jaafer Numeiri. Despite continuing attacks by government forces against Palestinian resistance strongholds, the cease-fire may end the full-scale fighting for the present but the prospect appears to be long-term civil conflict in which Washington supports the rule of Hussein.

Hussein's British- and American-trained Bedouin troops directed their main fire against refugee camps, killing thousands of noncombatants. As a result of this bloodbath, the Palestinian resistance is probably united on the need to oust the reactionary regime in Jordan, including Hussein himself. Prior to the recent fighting, such views were primarily attributed to leftist leaders such as Dr. George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

As the cease-fire went into effect, PFLP guerrillas released the remaining passengers and crew member of the aircraft they had seized earlier in the month. Guerrilla sources stated that they were releasing the detainees out of respect for the Jewish religious holidays and because food and water shortages would prevent proper treatment of their "guests."

[A formal cease-fire agreement for Jordan was signed Sept. 27 in Cairo by king Hussein, Yasser Arafat, head of Fateh and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and other Arab leaders. In giving recognition to the Palestinian cause, the agreement is considered a victory for them. However, Hussein will remain on the throne, though under the supervision of a three-man committee, comprised of the Tunisian premier and Jordanian and Palestinian representatives, until a "normal situation" is restored. Algeria, Morocco, Iraq and Syria declined to participate in the Cairo meetings of Arab states which helped draw up the agreement.]

The aircraft seizures and the detention of persons on the flights were merely a convenient excuse for Hussein's moves against the fedayeen, which had been in preparation for weeks if not months. Palestinian resistance leaders have pointed out that following the cease-fire with Israel under U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers' peace plan, Jordanian government forces began surrounding Amman and other points of commando strength. There were numerous provocations and attacks against guerrillas by government troops in the weeks preceding the proclamation of martial law on Sept. 15.

Furthermore, there is evidence that Washington encouraged Hussein's recent moves. Besides longstanding publicly affirmed U.S. support for Hussein, it appears that "Western military advisors are directly implicated. The Sept. 27 N.Y. Times reported that "Western military advisors in Amman were confident that king Hussein's forces could bring the commandos to heel in a

The unnamed "Westerners" are British and U.S. advisors who come with the military equipment that London and Washington have furnished to Jordan. There is a good probability that these military advisors were what Hussein referred to in an interview with Eric Rouleau of Le Monde last week, as his "intelligence service," which "fooled" him by providing "an idyllic picture of the situation, assuring me that we would overcome the resistance in a few hours."

It is also reasonable to assume that the British advisors in Amman now take second place to the Americans, notwithstanding former British preeminence there. For now Hussein has tied his fortunes to U.S. imperialism.

Indicative of the Washington-Amman relationship, during and after the Jordanian army's slaughter of thousands of noncombatant civilians, there was not a word of criticism from Washington (and other Western capitals) that had so recently denounced the "barbaric" and "piratical" aircraft seizures by Palestinian "extremists."

U.S. satisfied

On the other hand, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard indicated U.S. satisfaction with Hussein's "success." At a news conference Sept. 25, Packard characterized Amman's policies as supporting the "Nixon doctrine" of providing military equipment to friendly countries, in preference to the direct intervention by U.S. troops. Packard also said that the U.S. would give Jordan military equipment to replace that lost in the recent fighting.


In general, the Jordanian atrocities were played down in the U.S. But the Sept. 26 Washington Post reprinted a report from the conservative Figaro of Paris that helps put Hussein's support for the Nixon doctrine in its true light. In this account which was typical of reports in the Paris and London press, Thierry Desjardins wrote as follows:

"Amman is a murdered city. The fighting continued this morning, but it was as if Hussein was beating a corpse. His heavy artillery continues pounding the refugee camps with phosphorous bombs. But these camps no longer exist. For mile after mile, there is only ruins, mud, craters, twisted metal and screams.

"I was able to get to the Wahdat refugee camp [in Amman]. There had been 55,000 persons there; it was a gigantic shantytown where the poor souls lived—or starved—on international charity. They have been massacred. . . . Tonight, for five hours, the shells fell again. But on what? On the rubble of mud walls, on ruins that have been machine gunned . . . for the past eight days.

If The British Leave the Gulf . . .

Jan Nasmyth



Oilfields come and go. Some of the new discoveries, like those on the North Slope of Alaska, are sensational. But they do nothing to shake the preeminence of the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf as suppliers to the world. This preeminence is based on facts of geology, and none of the changes that are to be expected in politics, commerce, or technology will make any difference to it.

Vast efforts are being made and have been made for many years to diversify sources of supply of oil. There have been successes, but they do not alter the main outline of the problem. The world, and particularly the Western world, depends on the Persian Gulf for its oil supplies; this dependence is more likely to increase than it is to decrease.

The importance of the Gulf and the states adjacent

to it may be shown in two pairs of statistics in 1969: the world drew 28 percent of its oil from these states; the same states held 62 percent of the proved oil reserves. As the world begins to press on its reserves, it will depend more heavily on the Persian Gulf. The North Slope of Alaska was thought in the first published estimate to have an upper limit of 10 billion barrels of recoverable oil; the Gulf countries have 333 billion barrels of proven reserves.

The Persian Gulf once enjoyed the *pax Britannica* and has lately been suffering the symptoms of its withdrawal. Britain's position in Iraq collapsed in a bloody coup after the failure of the Anglo-French expedition to Port Said in 1956. The defense treaty with Kuwait was ended peaceably some years later, and last year the British Labour government decided that the remaining British forces should be withdrawn by the end of 1971. The new

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Exposes of US-aided torture and terror in Saigon's prisons have created a predictably brief flurry of liberal breast-beating and editorializing; but the exposure is not likely to challenge the US policies and programs that have openly supported and financed police repression in Vietnam for the last 15 years. One result of the belief that most wars in the world today are "police actions" is AID's Office of Public Safety, dedicated to international police-military cooperation and the development of national police forces as the "first line of defense" against existing or potential insurgencies. Con Son Prison is part of its program for "prisoner rehabilitation"; Public Safety is a Third World-wide program to foster "an atmosphere of confidence in law and order" —as its own propaganda proclaims.

Americans who were in Saigon in the late Fifties under the Michigan State CIA police advisory mission noted at the time that opposition politicians were frequently carted off to Con Son. The US government's own figures state that at least 70 percent of the prisoner population throughout Vietnam is political, and another nine percent is "military"—that is, POWs. It has been said for years that to know the status of the non-communist political opposition, Con Son was the place to go.

Both Congress and the US press corps in Saigon have ignored persistent attempts over the past year by tortured student leaders and others to bring public attention to the systematic political repression and terrorism that mark the staying-power of Thieu, Ky and US forces. Instead, they took the word of Saigon's US Public Safety Advisor Frank Walton, who declared Con Son to be "a correctional institution worthy of higher ratings than some prisons in the US" with "enlightened and modern administration."

More-----

correction

Desmond Stewart writes us that the original version of his review of Miles Copeland's *The Game of Nations*—June 22, 1970—did not imply that the CIA coup against Mosaddegh took place in the Arab world; the implication that it did was a slip in editing. . . . And from Miles Copeland comes a letter assuring us that he was not "for some years the junior member of a CIA team attached to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo" but was "the senior member of a team of management consultants hired by AID." *Editors.*

The Talky American

THE GAME OF NATIONS: The Amoralty of Power Politics. By Miles Copeland. Simon & Schuster. 318 pp. \$6.95.

DESMOND STEWART

Mr. Stewart has spent most of the last twenty years in the successor states of the Ottoman Empire: Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon. He is the author of a trilogy, The Sequence of Roles, and has just completed a study of the Near East called The Temple of Janus, which Doubleday will publish next year.

Mr. Miles Copeland was for some years the junior member of a CIA team attached to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. As name-dropper and influence peddler, he steered the resilient bump 'em car through the Middle East. But despite this rich experience, and despite his book's title and subtitle, Copeland's anti-memoirs distill no icy theorem of political strategy to set beside Machiavelli's *The Prince*. Nor do they constitute a factual account of happenings in the Levant. Such key events as the Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955, which had as its consequences Nasser's involvement with the Soviet Union, receive but sliding mention, while a prestigious dinner party at which the author was present straddles the book, appearing twice with an interval of many pages. Still less are we dealing with "faction," a neologism defined by Copeland as "fact presented in fictional terms," since the names, if not the conversations, are for real.

The Game of Nations is an indiscreet and undocumented reminiscence of a man employed in, or around, the CIA. It functions as a torpedo, fueled by love-hate, sent zigzagging against the Egyptian President; accidentally it harms the CIA, making it appear not so much lethal as silly and talkative (any future statesman inclined to unburden himself to one of its agents will weigh his words as if they were the kind of rocks once used for stoning).

Some of Copeland's revelations are so irresponsible as to endear him to liberals. His account of the one successful CIA intervention in the Arab world (the overthrow of Iran's Mossadegh and the restoration of the Shah) is a mixture of knockabout and naïveté. Arguing that in early 1949 "we weren't really Machiavellian and that the current idealism was almost as prominent in our covert activity as it was in our overt," Copeland evokes a CIA group—its one "near-genius intellect" significantly disapproving—looking for an area wherein to plot

an idealistic, not necessarily democratic but pro-American coup. Iraq, a sif of Britain, was rejected, not apparently because it was already the most pro-Western state in the region but because "all programmable evidence showed Nuri Pasha's Government to be virtually coup-proof." The area chosen for experimentation was Syria, then ruled by a wobbly parliamentary system.

In March 1949, Husni Za'im, a notorious Kurdish general, was assisted by these American idealists in launching what proved to be the first of an alphabet of Syrian coups. In power, he was a disappointment. "Za'im had been so 'amenable to suggestion' (as we said in our reports) before the coup that it never occurred to us that things would change afterwards." But change things did. Za'im insisted on Copeland's jumping to his feet when he came into the room; the friendly "tu" must yield to "vous"; so after four and a half months, Za'im went.

Syria was a mere rehearsal for Egypt, to the CIA, as to Napoleon, The Most Important Country. Initially, the CIA had thought to reorganize Egypt through a palace revolution led by Farouk. This marijuana vision wilted in the gray light of Abdin Palace. Instead, Kermit Roosevelt visited Cairo and established contact with the "Free Officers," in existence for many years but gingered by the fiasco of the first Palestine war. In Gamal Abdel Nasser the CIA recognized, Copeland believes, an ambitious and effective leader who would first establish a power base, the army, loyal to himself, since he would share the fruits of power with it, and then cooperate with such U.S. aims as the settlement of the conflict with Israel. In return for such accommodation, this archetypal leader, unfettered by democratic controls, would be given U.S. support to become a more powerful Arab leader than any in the past.

Copeland assures us—and the assurance must have shored his reputation in Washington as much as familiarity with "Walt" and "Dick" shored it in Cairo—that

Over the years I have probably seen more of Nasser than any other Westerner. Even now, although it is no longer possible to drop in on him, informally and stay for lunch, I manage a long talk with him every month or two, and under relaxed circumstances in which he is most likely to be himself. I have gone into these talks sometimes with no other purpose than a friendly social visit.

continued

The Secret Team and the Games They Play

by L. Fletcher Prouty

"The hill costumes of the Meo tribesmen contrasted with the civilian clothes of United States military men riding in open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and pistols. These young Americans are mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA contract to advise and train Laotian troops." Those matter-of-fact, almost weary sentences, written late in February by T.D. Allman of *The Washington Post* after he and two other enterprising correspondents left a guided tour and walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe a situation that today may seem commonplace to anyone familiar with American operations overseas, but that no more than 10 years ago would have been unthinkable.

To take a detachment of regular troops, put its members into disguise, smuggle them out of the country so that neither the public nor the Congress knows they have left, and assign them to clandestine duties on foreign soil under the command of a non-military agency—it is doubtful that anyone would have dared to suggest taking such liberties with the armed forces and foreign relations of the United States, not to say with the Constitution, to any President up to and especially including Dwight D. Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remarkable development in the management of America's relations with other countries during the nine years since Mr. Eisenhower left office has been the assumption of more and more control over military and diplomatic operations abroad by men whose activities are secret, whose budget is secret, whose very identities as often as not are secret—in short a Secret Team whose actions only those implicated in them are in a position to monitor. How determinedly this secrecy is preserved, even when preserving it means denying the United States Army the right to discipline its own personnel, not to say the opportunity to do justice,

was strikingly illustrated not long ago by the refusal of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide witnesses for the court-martial that was to try eight Green Beret officers for murdering a suspected North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the Army to drop the charges.

The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency and who react to those data when it seems appropriate to them with paramilitary plans and activities, e.g., training and "advising"—a not exactly impenetrable euphemism for "leading into battle"—Laotian troops. Membership in the Team, granted on a "need to know" basis, varies with the nature and the location of the problems that come to its attention. At the heart of the Team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council, most notably the chief White House adviser on foreign policy. Around them revolves a sort of inner ring of Presidential staff members, State Department officials, civilians and military men from the Pentagon, and career professionals in the intelligence services. And out beyond them is an extensive and intricate network of government officials with responsibility for or expertise in some specific field that touches on national security: think-tank analysts, businessmen who travel a lot or whose businesses (e.g., import-export or operating a cargo airline) are useful, academic experts in this or that technical subject or geographic region, and, quite importantly, alumni of the intelligence service—a service from which there are no unconditional resignations.

Thus the Secret Team is not a clandestine super-planning board or super-general staff but, even more damaging to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a bewildering collection of temporarily assembled action committees that respond pretty much ad hoc to specific troubles in various parts of the world, sometimes in ways that duplicate the

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DES MOINES, IOWA

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C.I.A. Business?

Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro made a serious charge in blaming the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon for the recent landing of armed anti-Castro guerrillas in eastern Cuba. The United States did launch the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, so Castro has a reason to be suspicious.

The United States government denied involvement in the 1970 invasion. But Alpha 66, an association of Cuban exiles in Miami, says it trained the guerrillas at a secret base in the Florida Everglades and sent them to Cuba.

If so, this too is a violation of international law by the United States. All governments have an obligation not to permit armed bands to use their territory as a base to attack a country with which they are not at war. The United States has made some efforts to enforce this rule since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, though the State Department does not accept the Russian thesis that the U.S. made a binding promise not to try to overthrow the Cuban government by force.

It would be possible for Alpha 66 to train and launch a small force without getting caught by the United States — and apparently this is a small force. By Wednesday Castro said his men had killed or captured nine and that only four remained.

But large operation or small, the legal principles are the same. Since the C.I.A. got found out for the Bay of Pigs and boasts leaked out about similar operations in Guatemala and Iran, it has been harder for the United States to deny convincingly its role in coups and guerrilla strikes all over the map. Americans just don't know whether to believe their own government or not. Many foreigners simply assume the United States is guilty.

EDITORIALS

The Third Indo-China War

It is the nature of governments to deceive. In the perspective of its two-century existence, the government of the United States is no worse than others. In fact, in its early history, its candor was considerably better than the average. Now, however, it appears to be making up for lost time. Mr. Nixon may plead, plausibly enough, that Vietnam is not his war. He did, however, undertake to get us out of it. The plain fact is that the war is being extended, and so far Mr. Nixon has done nothing to prevent its spread. On the contrary, his policy of Vietnamization is dragging us deeper into the Indo-Chinese quagmire. Unless he takes forthright action to arrest this trend, it will be difficult to avoid the suspicion that he is not averse to developments that will enable him to keep massive American military power in Asia, and that recent events have been largely of our making.

Of course, that is not the official scenario. Officially, we were taken by surprise when the coup ousted Prince Sihanouk; we are now waiting for the dust to settle, and perhaps hoping for events to take a turn that might redound to our advantage. There is a suggestion that Sihanouk was overthrown because the enemy is losing, is being pushed back, and that this accounts for the turn to the right in Cambodia which, though nominally neutralist, had been giving shelter to some 40,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese or Vietcong troops.

That scenario warrants scrutiny. It begins in Laos, where there was a tacit standstill with the enemy. It was incomplete, to be sure, but fighting was at a low level. The CIA upset that balance by egging on its mercenaries, deployed with the aid of American "advisers." The enemy retaliated and seized a major piece of the Plain of Jars. Did the CIA plan it that way? They may have been as innocent as unborn babes, but that is not their usual role. Anyhow, it happened; and it now appears that Laos is in dire straits—another domino is in danger of falling. There is one difference, however, from the earlier domino game: the public does not seem to be concerned. It does not demand that we "save" Laos; it would rather that we got out of Southeast Asia, and the sooner the better, as long as we retain some shreds of superpower dignity.

The illicit scenario continues with the coup in Cambodia. Whoever pulled the strings, the result was very much to the liking of the Pentagon and the CIA, and perhaps of an Administration bent on keeping a big, sprawling foothold in Asia. (See Michael Klare: "The Great South Asian War," *The Nation*, March 9.) It passes understanding that Prince Sihanouk's rivals should have acted so boldly, unless they had substantial covert backing. It may be assumed that the CIA no longer delivers sledgehammer blows, as in 1953 when Mossadegh was eliminated in Iran. Whatever weight the CIA threw into the scales may

have been tossed indirectly—perhaps through Thai intermediaries. (We know that Thai troops have been fighting on the American side in Laos, and that the Thai satraps are unexcelled in intrigue.)

So now the Vietcong and North Vietnamese who have been using the Cambodian sanctuary are caught in a squeeze between, on the east, the South Vietnamese, aided by reinforced American detachments close to the border and by American gunships firing into Cambodia, and on the west, such forces as the new government of Cambodia can muster. From the standpoint of the Pentagon and the CIA it is a much more agreeable situation than when Prince Sihanouk held the reins. It is worth noting, also, that General Westmoreland has long advocated military action against Cambodia.

Can our Southeast Asian allies act in matters of such importance without American approval and some kind of commitment that, if the gamble turns against them, Uncle Sam will not let them go down the drain? The Cambodians say they are not asking for American military help now. They do not say they will not ask tomorrow.

What has happened took considerable rigging. Did the President know about it? Did he want to know about it? How much control has Mr. Kissinger got over operations in the field? Does even General Abrams know exactly what goes on while he runs the war from a desk in Saigon and with an occasional visit to the numerous fronts for which he, or the CIA, is responsible?

In the news these latest developments are referred to as the second Indo-China war. The count seems short. First there was the war in which the French lost the flower of their officer corps and got the coup de grâce at Dienbienphu. Then there was the second Indo-China war, engineered mainly by Lyndon B. Johnson, and which proved his political nemesis. Now we have the third war. Will it rescue Mr. Nixon politically, or ruin him? He must be thinking hard; his risks are not small.

Back-of-the-Book

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The New Empire: A Star-Spangled Bummer

INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION. By Richard Barnet. *New American Library*, 1968. \$6.95. *Meridian*, 1969. \$2.95.

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Gabriel Kolko. *Beacon*, 1969. \$5.95.

THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM. By Harry Magdoff. *Monthly Review*, 1969. \$1.95.

VIETNAM, LIKE THE battle of the Alamo, is history. Scholars are already hard at work probing its warm entrails for lessons; books and conferences warn against future Vietnams. "Remember the Bay of Tonkin" rallies the troops for Fulbright's guerrilla raids on presidential power, while the future diplomatist somewhere on the edge of a university sit-in wonders, "What can we learn from this disaster?"

Every expert has his answer. For some, Vietnam was simply the wrong war in the wrong place. For others, it was Lyndon Johnson's arrogance of power. Liberal sophisticates, like Atlantic Editor Irving Kristol, even admit to a new imperialism. But, like the Cold War Liberals who earlier defended the nuclear arms race, the new Crackpot Realists fully accept the notion of "global responsibility," of "the inevitable burden of a great power." The experts, as Richard Barnet laments, seem to have learned from Vietnam only that we never should have fought in Vietnam.

Amateurs at foreign policy—those who people the Moratorium and block campus doorways to Dow recruiters—know better. Lacking "sophistication," they never learned to escape the similarities in Washington's responses to the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Vietnam. Looking back to the first post-war intervention in Greece, they see that Washington has continually sent military or paramilitary forces into other countries, either to fight popularly backed guerrilla movements or to

overthrow recalcitrant governments. According to Barnet's count, the U.S. managed to bat out these interventions on the average of one every 18 months. AID missionaries, university scholars and CIA agents put the intervention on a daily basis. National Guardsmen in urban ghettos and on college campuses have brought the pattern home.

Recognizing that a pattern exists, however, doesn't tell us its cause. If Vietnam is not an isolated mistake, what does lead the United States to intervene and how can we put an end to this pattern of aggression?

Two distinct camps within the anti-war movement have produced two very different answers. One camp, well represented in the liberal analysis of Richard Barnet, blames America's two, three, many Vietnams on Cold War anti-communism and the drive for power within government bureaucracies—military and civilian. The second, more radical camp, whose intellectual spokesmen include Gabriel Kolko and Harry Magdoff, hits out at either the political dominance of big business or at the inevitable thrust of America's big business economy. To date, the liberal attack on "the bureaucracy," aided by Wall Street's well-publicized peace rallies, has proved the more persuasive. But if people take time to compare the arguments of these three books, the radicals are likely to win some new adherents.

A FORMER STATE DEPARTMENT official and now co-director of Washington's loyal oppositionist Institute for Policy Studies, Richard Barnet lays America's interventionist policy at the feet of the National Security Managers—those officials in the State Department, Pentagon, CIA and the White House who manage U.S. foreign relations. Looking at over-all foreign policy rather than simply military strategy, Barnet differs with run-of-the-mill Pentagon-baiters. But like them, he sees the cause of intervention in "the bureaucratic compulsion to control as

much of the world as possible." He contends that the (chiefly civilian) national security bureaucrats intervene because they view Third World revolution as part of the Cold War with China and Russia.

Barnet challenges their Cold War myopia in terms that were already gaining popularity in the early part of the Kennedy Administration. By now his critique is something of a conventional wisdom, sustained by Russian passivism in the Third World, the possibilities of a new "open door" in Eastern Europe, and the recent wave of anti-militarism at home. According to this view, revolution in the less developed countries is neither an export of "International Communism" nor a threat to our national security. "Beyond the reach of the Red Army," says Barnet, "the Soviets soon abandoned the idea of exporting revolution. Indeed, a principal function of the Comintern was to cool revolutionary zeal where such activity would embarrass the Soviet government in its relations with other states."

Contrary to what Chairman Mao writes, Stalin steered the Chinese Communists into an early alliance with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and, consequently, into the Shanghai Massacre of 1927. The Great Russian Leader pushed similar "revisionist" policies in Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Spain and Greece. Those revolutionary movements that did take root, Barnet concludes, grew less out of this barren internationalism than out of the oppressive conditions of the countries in question.


Barnet's concern is that our National Security Managers, blinded by their Cold War anti-communism, are actually encouraging the oppressive conditions that feed revolution—especially when their strategy calls for intervention. But Barnet only shows why the National Security Managers should not intervene. He never explains why they do, except by pointing to their mistaken view of the world. Rather than a series of unrelated mistakes, then, America's

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A REPORT